ABSTRACT Efficient and economic parcel delivery becomes a key factor in the success of online shopping. Addressing this challenge, this paper proposes to crowdsource the parcel delivery task to urban vehicles to utilize their spare capacities, thus improving the efficiency while reducing traffic congestions. The delivery is planned as a multi-hop process, and participating vehicles will carry parcels from one shipping point to the next until they arrive at the destination, following the routes learned from the historical traffic statistics. The major contributions include an incentive framework to motivate the vehicles to participate in the delivery tasks by preserving the interests of the platform, the sender, and the crowd vehicles. Two incentive models are designed from platform-centric and user-centric perspectives, respectively. The platform-centric model first assesses an optimal reward R for parcel delivery with the principle of Stackelberg game, which enables the platform to maximize its profit. The user-centric model then applies a reverse auction mechanism to select the winning bids of vehicles while minimizing the sender cost, with truthfulness guarantee. Theoretical analysis and extensive experiments on a real urban vehicle trace dataset are provided to validate the efficacy of the proposed framework.
I. INTRODUCTION
The boom of online shopping lifted the logistics into a prominent challenge for E-commerce ecosystem. For example, China had about $1,000 billion online retails in 2017. Alibaba, the Chinese web commerce giant, turned November 11 into an annual e-shopping carnival and sold goods worth of $26.5 billion on that single day in 2017. All sales had to be delivered to the buyers within limited days. And the burst of delivery requests also bring opportunities and a series of linkage effects for urban development. Without efficient and smart solutions for logistics, the rapid advancement of online retailing might be obstructed by the economic and environmental costs.
The challenge has gained growing attentions in both industry and academia [27] . Specifically, vehicle monitoring technologies enable the application of crowdsourcing, which invites ordinary people to contribute, to redefine the The associate editor coordinating the review of this manuscript and approving it for publication was Longzhi Yang. delivery network to better evaluate and improve city logistics schemes [32] . For example, de Souze et al. [7] proposed a multi-party collaborative urban logistics solution by adopting an airline codeshare-like agreement from a business perspective, and the study in [19] has shown the opportunity of applying crowd-shipping services in business.
Conventionally, the logistics can be viewed as the delivery process which consists of planning, implementing and controlling procedures [3] . The delivery starts at the origin point and ends at the destination point [1] . For parcels or goods, an efficient delivery and storage under proper conditions are included in the logistics services. In contrast, Crowdsourcing [9] is a web-based business model, which tries to solve problems with a distributed network of individuals [16] .
Crowdsourcing has been successfully deployed in many domains [2] . For example, Wikipedia, which is a comprehensive online encyclopedia, shows the collaborative nature of crowdsourcing [16] .
In a crowdsourcing system, how to recruit and retain users is key challenge [8] . In comparison with interest-driven free-volunteering platforms, such as Wikipedia and Youtube, a paid mode may help to improve users' participation and even the quality of task accomplishment [33] .
With the prevalence of smart phones and locationbased services in vehicles, crowdsourcing provides a new sight to the challenges in logistics. Allowing everyday commuters to participate into the delivery of parcels may reinvent the logistics by crowdsourcing, along with mitigating the severe problems of urban traffic congestion and air pollution [23] , [28] , [35] . Several projects have been proposed to explore the direction [20] , [21] , [29] . Reference [4] proposed to utilize taxis to transport returned goods with the help of crowdsourcing platform. Some start-ups have also been launched and have attracted millions in investment, such as Roadie.
Most existing work either focused on the ''last mile delivery'' or ''one-hop delivery''. The former one proposes to recruit citizen workers to facilitate the last-mile delivery which is from the pop-station to the destination address. The latter one is to recruit the vehicles whose trajectory coincides with the delivery path from the source to the destination or the vehicles which are willing to detour to fulfill the delivery task. Neither of them considers the more flexible scenario of multi-hop delivery in which multiple vehicles participate in the delivery between the source and the destination.
The existing work has not explored the pricing and incentive mechanisms in depth. They apply either no such mechanism at all, or some naive pricing policies which compute the delivery costs merely based on the distance between the source and the destination. The lack of tailored incentive mechanism may compromise the requester utility and the deliverer profit. Moreover, in most existing work, the spatial characteristics of the transportation network and the social trend of sharing and collaboration 1 have not been fully exploited.
Therefore, in this paper, we propose a crowdsourcing framework with well-designed incentive mechanisms for multi-hop parcel delivery networks. It is capable of exploiting the trajectory of transportation and incorporating incentive pricing mechanism to achieve efficient and low-cost parcel delivery [13] .
The framework is illustrated in Fig.1 . A sender initializes the process by submitting a delivery request to the platform. The platform then plans a delivery route connecting some shipping points for the request. The plan is learned and based on the trajectory statistics, so that the route is more likely to be fulfilled by potential participants. Next, the platform broadcasts the tasks and their rewards associated with the planned route to potential participatory vehicles. Thereafter, vehicles voluntarily bid their desired sub-tasks and pick up the parcels from one shipping point and deliver to the next shipping point. 1 Market study [28] revealed more than 80% of drivers have helped other people to carry goods at least once. The proposed incentive framework consists of a platformcentric and a user-centric model [38] . The platform-centric model is executed first to help the platform to decide the optimal total reward for deliveries. With the constraints of this total reward, user-centric model is then executed which allows users to bid for the delivery tasks. Users can set up a reserve price and delivery distance to guarantee the bottom line of their benefit. The platform then selects the users with winning bids to deliver the parcels.
The main contributions of this paper can be summarized as follows:
• We propose a crowdsourcing multi-hop parcel delivery framework to utilize the spare capacity of urban vehicles.
• We design an incentive framework, which considers the cost of senders, the revenue of platform, and the benefits of participating vehicles, to motivate the drivers to participate in delivery tasks.
• We evaluate the proposed framework with extensive experiments on real dataset and demonstrate its effectiveness.
II. RELATED WORK
Two fields, crowdsourcing and the outsourced parcel delivery, are related to the proposed solution.
Crowdsourcing allows online tasks to be allocated to a group of participants offline. It has been successfully adopted in many areas, including image classification and proofreading. Karger et al. [18] used a probabilistic model to analyze the crowd quality and aggregate collected labels with lowrank approximation. In [35] , location-based crowdsourcing was applied to improve the performance of data dissemination in vehicular networks. However, these methods do not include incentive mechanisms to motivate the participants. In [36] and [37] , Yang et al. proposed to design an incentive mechanism for mobile phone sensing and proposed the platform-centric model and the user-centric model, where the former model looked for the best reward to maximize the revenue, and the latter allowed the participants to bid on their own benefits. However, the location information and the cost of senders are not considered. VOLUME 7, 2019 There have been several recent proposals for parcel delivery to meet the bursting demands of online shopping. Some work attempted to improve the efficiency of the last-mile delivery [14] , [24] . Reference [22] adopted a freight-pooling service to reduce the cost of delivery by optimizing the delivery route and using less resource for the last mile delivery. Handoko et al. [15] proposed to outsource the last-mile delivery task to maximize the profit by selecting the demands to be served. Cheng et al. [6] investigate on using crowdsourced public transportation systems in package distribution and propose an adaptive limitation delivery (ALD) method.
Other work in the field focused on ''one-hop delivery'' in which one vehicle is in charge of the delivery from the sender to the destination. Wang et al. [34] proposed a mobile crowd-tasking model for a pool of citizen workers and formulated it as a network min-cost flow problem.
In [29] , Sadilek et al. showed that parcels can be delivered with high speed and coverage with local greedy decisions if we know people's future locations and routes. They further manifested that the dynamic networks of mobile individuals are highly navigable. Reference [30] also presented an extensible algorithmic model which matches transportation requests with drivers whose travel plans are known in advance. Lee et al. [20] proposed a crowdsourced parcel service framework in which Markov Decision Process is adopted to obtain the optimal policy for the parcel delivery request. Chen et al. [5] proposed to outsource the entire shipping task and formulated it as an Integer Linear Programming problem which incorporates drivers' maximum detour, capacity limits and the option of transferring parcels between drivers. However, these solutions have little consideration on incentive mechanisms as they focus on the selection of drivers rather than motivating drivers to participate in.
Reference [17] proposed a crowdsource-enabled system with proper incentive mechanisms for urban parcel relay and delivery. However, it also focuses on the last-mile transportation.
III. MULTI-HOP DELIVERY NETWORK
This section introduces the key concepts in multi-hop delivery network, including shipping point deployment and transport route planning. They serve as the platform foundation for defining incentive mechanisms.
A. SHIPPING POINT DEPLOYMENT Fig.2 illustrates the layout and the distribution of vehicle locations at Cologne city in Germany (more details about the data are explained in the experiment section). Each small black point represents a vehicle, and each line shows the trace of a randomly selected car.
In reality, most vehicles have their routine paths [27] , and it becomes beneficial for them to share their spare capacities and work collaboratively for parcel delivery if the delivery route matches their own routes. Let a route be defined as a line between a pair of shipping points. At shipping points, the participatory vehicles could pick up or drop off parcels, thus the parcels could be transferred via a multi-hop schema where the traces and spare capacities of vehicles could be fully utilized.
The locations of shipping points are vital to the success of efficient multi-hop delivery. In this paper, we use DBSCAN [10] -a well-known density-based clustering algorithm to determine the locations of shipping points (labeled as orange solid circle in Fig.2 ). In general, the shipping points should be located in hotspot areas where large volume of traffic should occur most of the time. In this sense, it would be easy to find a carrier for a parcel. The distance between any two shipping points is set to be greater than 1km to avoid jitter.
The density-based shipping point deployment is applied in this paper for simplicity. However, in practice, the shipping points might be deployed according to other factors, such as the land cost, urban planning or other economical or municipal constraints.
B. TRANSPORT ROUTE PLANNING
Given a delivery request, the route from the source to the destination is in fact a sequence of shipping points. Based on the historical statistics of the vehicles' trajectories, we use the reciprocal of the frequency of vehicles passing from shipping point A to shipping point B as the weight of the connection between two adjacent shipping points. Then, Dijkstra's algorithm can be applied to compute the optimal or ''shortest'' path for each parcel [26] . That is, the algorithm selects the most ''popular'' path as the planned delivery path. In this way, the chance of finding a carrier instantly gets increased.
IV. INCENTIVE FRAMEWORK
The incentive framework is a 2-step game. In this section, we first introduce the platform-centric incentive model which tries to maximize the platform revenue by utilizing Stackelberg game to find the optimal reward R on the platform side. Then a user-centric incentive model, which applies the principle of reverse auctions to find most appropriate vehicles [11] for specific delivery tasks with the constraint of R, is discussed. Table 1 tabulates the frequently used notations throughout the paper. 
A. PLATFORM-CENTRIC INCENTIVE DESIGN
Finding a reasonable reward is crucial for the incentive mechanism in which users are motivated to participate in the job while the platform achieves a maximum benefit. We model the platform-centric incentive mechanism as a Stackelberg game [12] , in which the platform is the leader and vehicles are the followers. There are two stages in this game: 1) the platform announces its reward R and routes L, 2) each user strategizes its delivery distance to maximize its utility.
Let P denotes the set of parcels at a shipping point. l ip denotes the delivery distance of vehicle i for parcel p ∈ P, and l ip > 0. If vehicle i does not participate in delivering parcel p, then l ip = 0. The cost of the delivery is calculated as l ip c i , where c i > 0 is the unit cost for one-kilometer delivery. Following a common assumption that the reward received by vehicle i is proportional to its travel distance l ip , the benefit of vehicle i is:
where l ip ≤ R/c i , and l * q denotes the delivery distance of parcel q transported from the shipping point. 2 To study the optimal delivery distance of each vehicle and find the best reward R, 3 we compute the derivatives ofū i with respect to l ip :
As shown in Eq. (3), the second-order derivative ofū i is negative. Therefore, the utilityū i is a strict concave function of l ip . Therefore, given any R > 0, we can find the maximal reward for each vehicle. Setting the first derivative ofū i to 0, we have:
Solve Eq.(4) for l ip :
To guarantee l ip ≥ 0, Eq. (5) is further modified as:
When R ≤ c i q∈P\{p} l * q , l ip is set to 0 to denote that user i does not participate in delivering parcels to avoid a deficit. Due to the concavity ofū i , there is a largest gain for each vehicle involved when choosing an optimal delivery distance. That is, there is a unique Nash Equilibrium for the delivering vehicles. A vehicle has a unique best response [36] when other vehicles have a strategy of their delivery distance. For each vehicle, it satisfies Eq.(4).
Summing up Eq.(4), we have
where i∈V l i * = q∈P l * q . Therefore, we have
Apply Eq. (8) into Eq.(4), then:
2 Note that the parcel q may be delivered by any available vehicles of the current station. 3 Note that R is the announcing reword for a particular shipping point which have P parcels to deliver out VOLUME 7, 2019 where |V | represents the number of vehicles involved in delivering parcels at a shipping point.
The sender's cost can be defined according to the number of the delivering vehicles and the delivery distance. For parcel p, the set of delivering vehicles is V p , and the cost for sender is given as:
where γ is the system parameter. log(1 + l ip ) reflects that the sender's cost is determined by the delivery distance which is consistent with the conventional economical observations in logistics.
The profit of platform is the difference between the incomes from senders and the expenses as the reward to drivers. Therefore, the utility of the platform that a shipping point completes all tasks is:
The goal of the platform is to maximize the shipping point utility, and to lower the senders' cost to attract them. As lg(x+ y) < lg(x)+lg(y) holds when x > 2 and y > 2, and in practice the distance between two adjacent shipping points is usually larger than 1km, the model will try to choose longer distances to lower the senders' cost and to maximize the shipping point utility, which results in fewer delivering vehicles and less overhead expenses. According to the analysis, the platform, which is the leader in the Stackelberg game, knows that there is an optimal delivery distance for each user when the platform gives any value of R and routes of parcels. Hence, the platform can maximize its utility by choosing the optimal R. Vehicles will participate in delivering tasks if and only if they can gain benefits, or l ip > 0. Apply Eq.(9) into Eq.(11), we have:
where N =
). The second order derivative ofū 0 is:
Since
< 0, the utilityū 0 is a concave function of R for R ∈ (0, +∞), and it has a maximum value R * , which will enable the platform to achieve the maximal utility. R * can be efficiently computed using either bisection or Newton method [31] . The detailed process is listed in Algorithm 1.
B. USER-CENTRIC INCENTIVE DESIGN
After the execution of platform-centric mechanism (Algorithm 1), the optimal reward R for a specific shipping point is determined. Thereafter, in the user-centric model, once the platform announces R and planned routes L for parcels, user i submits the task-bid pair θ ip = (l ip, b ip ), where b ip is user i's proposed unit bid, indicating the reserve price that the user wants to sell the service for. Each user has an associated cost 
C i
* indicating its fuel cost, etc., which is privately known. The user-centric model chooses a vehicle to deliver parcel p according to the unit bid price and delivery distance l ip . The winning vehicle i will be paid by the platform at f i . Therefore, the utility of user i is defined as:
The utility of the shipping point for parcel p is
where g(θ ip ) is the value produced by vehicle i carrying parcel p with distance l ip . g(θ ip ) is actually the same as sender cost s p . As g(θ ip ) is proportional to l ip , and each shipping point is willing to maximize its utilityũ p , the longer the distance a vehicle offers to deliver, the higher possibility the shipping point selects the vehicle. A special case is that the shipping point selects the vehicle which could directly send the parcel to the destination without using any relay shipping point. Thus, a single-hop delivery is a special case of our multi-hop delivery framework.
1) BID SELECTION SCHEMA
The bid selection schema should guarantee the truthfulness of the bidding process such that each vehicle reveals its true cost in the bid to maximize its utility. During the course of auction, each vehicle is independent. The platform should ensure the soundness of bidder selection, preventing users from falsely announcing their costs. We define a ratio η p to measure the best return for parcel p, given as
where
V is the set of vehicles which participate in the bidding.
The benefit for vehicle i can now be defined as:
The vehicle selection process, as well as the payment, is provided in Algorithm 2.
Algorithm 2 Bidder Selection for Shipping Points
Require: task-bid pair (l ij, b ij ) Ensure: delivering vehicles V V , V ← {φ} # participatory vehicles V ← {v 1 , v 2 , ...v n } # Selecting the vehicles which may be eligible
2) THEORETICAL ANALYSIS FOR BID SELECTION SCHEMA
This section proves that the proposed bidding schema has the following desired properties.
a: TRUTHFULNESS
According to Myerson statement [25] , a bidding schema is truthful if and only if: 1) the winning bid allocation is monotonic, and 2) each winning bid is paid at the threshold cost. The proposed bidding schema satisfies these two conditions.
Lemma 1: If a bid θ ip = (l ip, b ip ) wins parcel p, then the alternate bidθ ip = (l ip,bip ) also wins, whereb ip ≤ b ip .
Proof:
Thus,θ ip should be chosen as the bidder selection process is greedy.
Lemma 2: Winning bid θ ip = (l ip, b ip ) is paid at its threshold cost, and vehicle i would not win the auction if its bid is higher than the value produced by the vehicle.
Proof: The payment to each winning bid in V is given
If user i bids but the situation is l ip b ip > f i , user i may reject to deliver the parcel.
Assume that a vehicle is selected to delivering the parcel after M -th iteration. So,
That is, l ip b ip is the threshold payment for vehicle i since higher bids may prevent it from winning the auction.
Lemma 1 and Lemma 2 prove that the winning bid allocation is truthful.
b: INDIVIDUAL RATIONALITY
The payoff of each winning bid should be nonnegative: 
c: PROFITABILITY
If there is at least one vehicle,ũ p > 0.
Proof: Similar to the proof of truthfulness, a vehicle is selected after M -th iteration, then
d: COMPUTATIONAL EFFICIENCY
The bid selection schema should be computationally efficient.
Proof: Assume there are n vehicles that are willing to deliver parcels. As shown in Algorithm 2, finding vehicles with maximum marginal value takes O(n). The complexity of the bidding process is bounded by O(npm), where m is the number of winners.
V. EXPERIMENTS A. DATASET AND SIMULATION SETTINGS
To evaluate the performance of the proposed mechanisms, extensive simulations were tested based on a real dataset of vehicle traces, which were collected from 6:00am to 8:00am for 121 thousand vehicles traveling in Cologne -the third largest city in Germany covering an area of 405.15km 2 . For each vehicle, its GPS coordinates (longitude and latitude) and the corresponding ID were recorded every second.
A parcel is either in in-transit status, or lying at a certain shipping point to be taken away. If there is no vehicle passing by (within 200 meters of the shipping point) in 2 hours, the delivery task is considered to be failed. Furthermore, to simulate that only a fraction of drivers are willing to participate in the delivery, parameter ξ is introduced to denote the probability that each vehicle is willing to get involved in a certain task.
In the experiments, the cost of each vehicle is assumed to be uniformly distributed over [0.1, 0.2]. γ (Eq.(10) is set as 2ln10, and various settings of ξ are tested.
B. STATION POINTS DEPLOYMENT EVALUATION
In this section, we perform experiments to evaluate the effects of the deployments to the crowd-sourcing framework. Four deployments are simulated in this paper. Two of them are conforming to a geographically evenly distributed design (GEDD), with different settings of the number of shipping points. The other two deployments are generated according to the approach proposed in Sec.III-A, which is a trajectory density-based design (TDBD), with different settings of the number of shipping points. TABLE 2 tabulates the detailed performance with respect to the four deployments. To make a fair comparison, the probability of bidding ξ for each candidate vehicles is set to be 1, which enables all vehicles driving along the shipping routes to participate into the crowd-sourcing tasks. 18,000 delivery tasks are generated by randomly selecting the source and the destination position of each, and then utilized to evaluate the deployments. We can observe that TDBD can achieve a much higher success rate compared with GEDD in a similar scale in terms of the number of shipping points. The reason behind is that the shipping points in TDBD are selected according to the ''popularity'' of a position by utilizing DBScan -a density-based clustering approach to explore the trajectories of vehicles as well as covering the city. Whereas GEDD only considers the coverage of the city by selecting evenly distributed positions. For TDBD, a denser deployment guarantees a higher success rate (See 78 s.p. V.S. 100 s.p.). Whereas in GEDD, a different deployment may result in desolate shipping points being selected which will lead to a rather low success rate (See 71 s.p. V.S. 98 s.p.).
Moreover, we can observe that TDBD result in lower average sender's cost, lower average transition distances, and lower average # hops. Again, it benefits from the trajectory density-based design. The popular trajectories enable the process of bidding more competitive to lower the sender's cost which is important to attract the users of the platform.
Thus, in the following sections, we stick to the deployment of TDBD with the 100 shipping points selected by DBScan to cover the entire area of the city, resulting in 9900 possible pairs of shipping point combinations in the form of < shipping_point i , shipping_point j >. Each pair was considered as a partial route for a parcel delivery task. 4 C. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION Fig.3 represents the simulation results at a randomly selected shipping point with respect to the performance features of the proposed incentive framework. To simplify the discussion, it is assumed that each vehicle can only carry at most 1 parcel each time. The results can be easily extended to more general settings. 3a shows the relationship between the overall delivery distance and the number of delivering vehicles, a.k.a. the number of parcels. In general, if there are more delivering vehicles, the distance grows accordingly. However, since R is fixed, the average reward to each vehicle reduces. Therefore, there is a ceiling for the maximum distance, and vehicles intends to travel shorter distances. The results illustrate the effectiveness of the proposed incentive mechanism if an optimal R can be found. Fig.3b also shows that in case of a fixed R, the senders' cost increases along with the needed distance for delivery. This is a rational phenomenon consistent with the well-accepted pricing rules in conventional logistic market. Fig.3c shows the impact of the number of delivering vehicles on the sender's cost for one parcel in its complete journey from the original source to the final destination. Since the route is fixed in this case, the distance of delivery remains unchanged. The sender's cost increases along with the number of delivering vehicles, which reflects the overhead caused by frequent hand-overs. Addressing this feature, the proposed user-centric incentive model intends to recruit as less as possible vehicles to complete one particular task to reduce senders' cost, while maximizing the rewards of delivering vehicles. Fig.3d illustrates the relationship between the reward R and the platform utility. It proves that there is an optimal R with which the platform can achieve its maximum utility. The performance comparison between the proposed incentive framework and non-incentive solution for parcel outsourcing delivery tasks is provided in Fig. 4 . FIFO (First In First Out) mechanism is chosen to represent non-incentive mechanisms, in which the task is allocated to the vehicle which arrives at the shipping point first among all vehicles which have answer the request of platform. It assumes that all vehicles are rational and honest. Fig.4a shows that the utility of platform achieved by our proposed incentive framework has a boost of more than 20%. At the same time, the senders' cost has a reduction of more than 10% (Fig.4b) . Moreover, the truthfulness feature of the proposed solution can guarantee that all participatory vehicles bid with rationality and honesty.
Success rate of the parcels completing their entire journeys via the participatory vehicles is another key indicator for the usefulness of a crowdsourcing platform. Fig.5 shows the study on the success rate with regard to various probability of bidding ξ . Fig.5a shows the relationship between the success rate of parcel deliveries and the probability of bidding for each vehicle. The system can achieve 90% of success rate even when ξ = 40%, which proves the feasibility of delivery outsourcing. The success rate increases slowly with the growth of ξ . There is only 4% improvement to the success rate when ξ increases from 40% to 100%. When ξ is set lower than 10%, the success rate has dropped sharply. Fig.5b presents the distribution of completed delivery tasks over hop numbers for given ξ values. Despite ξ , around 80% tasks are delivered with only one or two hops, which means the majority of delivery tasks can be completed by hiring one or two vehicles. Fig.5c shows the number of cars passing by each shipping point from 6:00am to 8:00am. In average, there are about 2,800 vehicles at each shipping point in two-hour period. Therefore, finding a vehicle to transport the parcel can be considered as an event with high probability. As the set of vehicles provided in the dataset captures only a small fraction of real transportation traffic in the city, we argue that our framework is applicable in a real scenario in terms of the task completion.
In the experiments, we assume that the duration of a delivery is from the time when the parcel is initially picked up, to the time that it arrives at the destination. Fig.5d presents the distribution of successful tasks over the distance, the duration of the transportation, and the number of hops. The figure represents the results with ξ = 40%. The patterns of results are similar with different ξ . Fig.5d shows that most tasks can be completed within 100 minutes, and the duration of transportation gradually increases along with the number of hops and the distances. As the trajectory data set was collected between 6:00am to 8:00am, and most tasks in experiments can be completed in 1.5 hours, it is reasonable to foresee that a more robust and higher success rate can be achieved if the time limit is dismissed.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we propose to crowdsource parcel delivery tasks to urban vehicles to utilize their spare capacities. In this scenario, we expect to mitigate the traffic congestion and air pollution caused by the bursting requests of e-retailing. The major contributions include an incentive framework to motivate the vehicles to participate in the delivery tasks by preserving the interests of the platform, the sender, and the crowd vehicles. Two incentive models are designed from platform-centric perspective and user-centric perspective, respectively. The platform-centric model first assesses an optimal reward R for parcel delivery with the principle of Stackelberg game, which enables the platform to maximize its profit. The user-centric model then applies a reverse auction mechanism to select the winning bids of vehicles while minimizing the sender cost, with truthfulness guarantee. Theoretical analysis and extensive experiments are provided to validate the efficacy of the proposed framework. 
